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“FAIREST OF THEM ALL” AND
OTHER FAIRY TALES OF
FAIR USE
DAVID NIMMER*
I
INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, in a happy land, courts decided which usage constituted
fair use in copyright cases, and justice prevailed throughout the realm. Then
the Royal Council (“Congress”) imported something from beyond the sea
called “codification.” Henceforward, the Council proclaimed, the law-books
would spell out if usage were fair or unfair in four pellucid factors.1 The Wisest
Men of the Kingdom (“Supreme Court”) declared that the result in any given
case would depend on all four of the factors.2 The Copyright Specialists
(“Second Circuit”) added, “[b]ecause this is not a mechanical determination, a
party need not ‘shut-out’ her opponent on the four factor tally to prevail,”3 to
which Soothsayers embroidered that if nonetheless “she does so, victory on the
fair use playing field is assured.”4 But these are only fairy tales.5
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This essay develops oral remarks delivered at the Duke Conference on the Public Domain. I thank
Mark Lemley, Neil Netanel and Eugene Volokh for disagreeing with parts and Robert Kasunic for
rejecting it in toto.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) embodies four factors, culled from cases decided under the Copyright
Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976). See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A] (rel. no. 58, 2002).
2. As the Court noted:
The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis. . . . Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in
isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light
of the purposes of copyright.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
3. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 740 (2d Cir. 1991).
4. Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1079 (2d Cir. 1992).
5. Apropos of which I must add that the Seventh Circuit long ago recognized protection for
research undertaken in the tales of Hans Christian Andersen based upon original Danish sources. See
Toksvig v. Bruce Publ’g Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950). But the Supreme Court later sang “the swan
song for Toksvig, a case that has been long derided in any event as a judicial ugly duckling.” 1
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.11[E].
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II
FLOSSING AND TRANSUBSTANTIATION
David Lange’s foundation paper contains language that usefully serves as
the launching pad for my own analysis:
In short, appropriation flourishes. The copyright industries concede privately that it
cannot be eliminated in individual cases unless a massive effort at brainwashing should
persuade an entire generation of primary school children to accept the main tenets of
copyright into their personal belief systems and then to hold them there and act upon
them, along with such other items of prescribed doctrine as flossing and transubstan6
tiation.

The final language struck responsive chords for me, given recent copyright
cases I have handled in the domains, respectively, of flossing and transubstantiation.
A few years back, I participated in a case before the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, defending Colgate-Palmolive in a case that Procter &
Gamble, the maker of Crest, brought against it.7 When Colgate entered the
very lucrative Chinese market, it aired a television commercial showing two
eggs: one bathed in fluoride, the other not.8 After sitting overnight, the egg
removed from the fluoride is tapped, and found to be solid; the untreated egg,
by contrast, cannot withstand a tap and breaks. So with your teeth, Colgate’s ad
demonstrated.
But Crest was not buying. In preparing for the case, I reviewed a series of
toothpaste commercials going back to the 1960s. Crest had done an earlier ad
for the Chilean market actualizing a similar fluoride experiment. I compared
the two ads. The one did not look much like the other: one guy was wearing a
serape, the other was eating with chopsticks; one commercial was narrated in
Spanish, the other in Mandarin. But both did illustrate how putting an egg in
fluoride protects it against decay, and why the viewer should go out and buy
crate-loads of toothpaste immediately.
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. illustrates the idea–
expression dichotomy in copyright law. Our client’s brief argued extensively
that such similarity as existed between Crest’s and Colgate’s advertisements lay
in the unprotectable realm, and did not cross the threshold to becoming
substantial similarity in expression. Our client ultimately prevailed in the
Second Circuit, although on the alternative basis that Colgate independently
created the particular commercial at issue, rather than copying it from Crest.9
The other case that comes to mind unfolded earlier this year: I litigated the
copyright renewal status of The Urantia Book, a 2,000-plus-page occult book
6. David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use and Transformative Critical
Appropriation 130, 140 (presented at the Duke Conference on the Public Domain, Nov. 9, 2001)
available at http://law.duke.edu/pd/papers/langeand.pdf.
7. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1999).
8. A host of commercials were at issue in the case. Some actually used a cowrie shell instead of an
egg.
9. Colgate-Palmolive, 199 F.3d at 78.
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whose devotees believe it was authored, as the tome itself declares, in part by
the Archangels of Nebadon, in part by the Corps of Superuniverse Functionaries, with interstitial amendments by the Thought Adjuster, and so on.10 The
Urantia Foundation registered the book as a composite work, a category of the
Copyright Act that applies to something to which a great number of individuals
contributed, such as an encyclopedia.11 Both parties to the litigation believed
The Urantia Book to be a composite work, because they accepted that it was
written by the Archangels of the Nebadon, the Corps of Superuniverse Functionaries et al. But I argued to the Western District of Oklahoma that, as a
secular court, its job was not to investigate the esoteric truth behind the book’s
revelations, but rather to look at the exoteric circumstances of its composition.
Lo and behold, as it appeared in this sublunary realm, its manuscript appeared
all in the handwriting of a single individual. Therefore, I concluded, The Urantia Book was not a composite work; ergo, it was not validly renewed. The jury
found in favor of my client on that basis. The matter currently awaits resolution
by the Tenth Circuit.
These cases illustrate the two poles of copyright. The Colgate case is one of
transubstantiation; namely, the idea–expression dichotomy and substantial
similarity. It poses the metaphysical inquiries of where an idea ends and
expression begins, and how substantial an appropriation must be to infringe.
The Urantia litigation, by contrast, concerns flossing; namely, how does one
take the language of the Copyright Act defining “composite work” and break
one’s teeth on it in a concrete situation? Both problems loom large in the copyright realm.
Someone who wishes to operate a service called, let’s say, My.MP3.com,12 to
which 10,000 songs will be uploaded, must actually be prepared to clear rights in
10,000 sound recordings, and separately in another 10,000 musical works,13 for a
subtotal of 20,000. And, of course, there’s a reproduction right, a public distri-

10. Much previous litigation had arisen concerning the same work. E.g., Urantia Found. v.
Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1997); Urantia Found. v. Burton, 210 U.S.P.Q. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1980);
Urantia Found. v. King, 194 U.S.P.Q. 171 (C.D. Cal. 1977). See also infra note 40. My own paean to
the work is contained in David Nimmer, Back from the Future: A Proleptic Review of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855, 861 (2001) (“So why on Urantia did Congress
need to add a specific exemption . . . ?”).
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
12. Litigation targeting that service has been multiple. E.g., Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282
F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002); Teevee Toons, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
UMG Record’gs, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0472 (JSR), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17907
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2000); UMG Record’gs, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
UMG Record’gs, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 2000 Copr. L. Dec. ¶ 28,141 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); UMG Record’gs,
Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In my estimation, the most noteworthy
aspect of those multiple decisions has been their revolutionary decoupling of the magnitude of the
statutory damages awards from actual damages caused or profits earned by infringement. See 4
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §14.04[E][1] (forthcoming 2003)
[hereinafter NIMMER 2003].
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, §§ 2.05, 2.10.
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bution right, and a public performance right for each copyrighted work.14 So
now we’re up to 60,000 potential claimants. But who’s to say that only one
claimant exists for each right? When jazz legend Billy Strayhorn took the “A”
Train to the great hereafter, his estate was composed of one sister and eleven
nieces and nephews.15 Depending on an author’s date of death relative to the
births of children and grandchildren, it is easy to imagine five or ten heirs to a
deceased author’s estate. The count could thus reach 300,000 or 600,000 entities
whose permission is needed. That’s a lot of flossing! In all likelihood, it would
not be possible to hire enough dentists and hygienists for the job. Nonetheless,
at base, the problem is mechanical—if one could identify the numerous claimants and secure rights from each, the situation would be resolved.
III
FAIR USE
Other problems continue to bedevil even those who have done their homework completely. Copyright law is built on such transcendental distinctions as
the idea–expression dichotomy, substantial similarity, and finally, fair use.
What use is fair? Here, we enter a great divide: All three issues grew up as part
of copyright doctrine through its common-law development, but in the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress attempted no categorization of either the idea–
expression dichotomy or substantial similarity. As to the former, it simply
defined “work[s] of authorship” to exclude “any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,”16 without
defining those various terms.17 As to the latter, the Act itself made no attempt
to mark the threshold for when similarity becomes substantial, leaving the
matter to its traditional domain of judicial explication.18
On the fair use front, Congress took a different tack: It synthesized prior
case law developments into four statutory factors.19 Moreover, alone among
provisions of the 1976 Act, fair use has reached the Supreme Court on multiple
occasions. There are now four majority opinions (and several dissents) explicating the four factors. 20 One could accordingly posit that, unique among copyright’s transcendental issues, fair use has been worked through a Summa Theologica21 or, if you will, Talmudic exposition followed by codification in a sort of
14. It should be noted that the public performance right for sound recordings is limited largely to
interactive webcasting. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 8.22.
15. Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d 364, 366 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining numerous other terms).
18. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03.
19. See supra note 1.
20. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207
(1990); Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
21. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., Christian Classics, 1981) (1274). Leave it to one of the world’s most original pens to conflate the
SUMMA with GULLIVER’S TRAVELS. See Jorge Luis Borges, A Weary Man’s Utopia, in COLLECTED
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Mishneh Torah.22 We should, therefore, expect fair use to have been demystified from transubstantiation to straightforward ingestion. 23
How do the factors work out in practice? The literature reveals that
judges,24 treatise writers,25 and other commentators26 offer a host of different
explanations for how fair use cases actually get decided, apart from the four factors. The present examination, by contrast, takes the factors at face value,
seeking to test whether, as advertised, they determine the analysis.
The following chart summarizes fair use cases decided since issuance of the
most recent decision of the Supreme Court quartet.27 Each heading in the chart
sets forth whether the factor in question favors fair use or cuts against it.28 Thus,
four Fairs represent the “fairest of them all,” four Unfairs the weakest fair use

FICTIONS 461-62 (Andrew Hurley trans., 1998) (“[I]n any case, it is not the reading that matters, but the
rereading.”).
22. The great Maimonides took the entire corpus of the Babylonian Talmud (itself an elaborate
explication of Biblical laws) and distilled it into fourteen volumes, called the Mishneh Torah
(“repetition of the law”) or Yad Chazakah (“strong hand” punning on the fact that the Hebrew word
for hand signifies the numeral fourteen).
23. Before the 1976 Act, one could posit that confusion clouded the fair use issue. In fact, the only
two times before 1976 that the Supreme Court had a 4-4 split in a copyright dispute were both fair use
cases. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew’s, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
24. Fair use may be unique among copyright doctrines in having inspired numerous Second Circuit
judges to join battle on the issue not only in their judicial opinions, but also in the pages of the reviews.
See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Commentary: Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990);
Roger J. Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play?, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1 (1989); Jon
O. Newman, Not the End of History: The Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y 12 (1989); James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 38 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 63 (1990). As the Second Circuit itself notes about its members’ scholarly
contributions: “Some of these articles are highly critical of the state of the law with respect to the fair
use doctrine and offer suggestions for improvement.” New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Carol Publ’g
Group , 904 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990). In that spirit, Second Circuit
Judges Oakes, Leval, and Miner were among the witnesses to testify before Congress regarding an
amendment to the fair use doctrine. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-836 (1992).
25. My own opinion is that the fourth factor is the most important. 4 NIMMER, supra note 1,
§ 13.05[A][4]. But “even if viewed as central, this factor cannot substitute for an evaluation of each of
the four statutory factors.” Id. at 13-182. To flesh out application of the fourth factor, my father
proposed application of the “functional test” to determine if a given usage is fair. See id. § 13.05[B].
For the application of that test to the chart set forth below, see infra note 57.
26. E.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661
(1988); Wendy Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614-22 (1982); Alex Kozinski &
Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use? The 1999 Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture,
46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 513 (1999); Karen Burke LeFevre, The Tell-Tale “Heart”: Determining “Fair”
Use of Unpublished Texts, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 165 (Spring 1992); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
27. The “quartet” is Campbell, Stewart, Harper & Row, and Sony. Given that Campbell, the most
recent case, was handed down on March 7, 1994, the chart commences after that date.
28. It should be noted that Fair (or Unfair) for one of the four factors indicates that that particular
factor inclines the result in that direction; by contrast, the final column in the chart tracks the court’s
actual conclusion as to whether the given utilization was Fair (or Unfair).
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defense.29 The column for the first fair use factor (“purpose and character of the
use”)30 resuscitates31 the label “Productive”32 to indicate Fair when the defendant
reworks the plaintiff’s expression to create a new work of authorship,33 itself
capable of copyright protection,34 and does not simply re-present the esthetics of
plaintiff’s work. The next column recognizes that “[t]he factor two analysis35
provides additional protection to works that are unpublished or that are creative or fictional.”36 The next column addresses the third factor37 by inquiring
whether defendant reproduced essentially the entire copyrighted work.38
Finally, the penultimate column addresses the fourth factor39 by inquiring
whether defendant’s use deprived plaintiff of revenue that likely would have
accrued absent the allegedly infringing conduct.
29. The situation is actually more complicated. See infra text accompanying note 61. Thus, the
first factor alone could be isolated into four discrete subcategories, of which the above chart covers only
one. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05[A][1][a] – [d].
30. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
31. The current vogue is to use the label “transformative,” deriving from Leval, supra note 24, at
1111. As the Supreme Court comments, citing Judge Leval quoting Justice Story, the “central purpose
of this investigation [under the first fair use factor] is to see . . . whether the new work merely
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation (citation omitted), or instead adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’”
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 579. I am avoiding that term here, as its application
has proven less than uniform in the case law. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05[A][1][b] (“Instead of
such conclusory applications, one should perform the transformative inquiry on its own merits, bearing
in mind that just because a given use qualifies as ‘transformative’ does not even mean that defendants
prevail under the first factor, much less that they prevail altogether on the fair use defense.”).
32. The Ninth Circuit used this standard in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963,
970 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Although the Supreme Court reversed, it conceded that
the “distinction between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance,
but it cannot be wholly determinative.” 464 U.S. at 455 n.40. The dissent discerned productive use as a
“common theme” facilitating “socially laudable purposes.” Id. at 478-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
But it stopped short of declaring “that every productive use is a fair use.” Id. at 808.
33. Another area of confusion concerns whether the defendant’s usage qualifies as “productive”
because the defendant produced a new work that itself transforms plaintiff’s work, or alternatively
reproduces plaintiff’s work wholesale, albeit in the context of a greater whole that is itself
copyrightable. For instance, in Case Nine treated below, a newspaper reproduced an allegedly racist
allegory from a police monthly newsletter. Belmore v. City Pages, 880 F. Supp. 673, 675 (D. Minn.
1995). There is no question that defendant’s newspaper, considered as a whole, is a new work of
authorship. Yet, because it reproduced the allegory in its entirety, the usage is listed as non-productive.
34. For this purpose, I elide the further inquiry whether the defendant’s incorporation of material
from plaintiff without authorization would itself deprive defendant of copyright protection for its new
creation. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“The subject matter of copyright . . . includes . . . derivative works, but
protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any
part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”)
35. The statute simply refers to “the nature of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
36. Robinson v. Random House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (“amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole”).
38. Again raising case-specific questions, such as: Was the usage less than the plaintiff’s registered
work, but nonetheless the entirety of a work that is capable of living its own copyright life? The phrase,
albeit arising in another context, is drawn from Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096,
1105 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (“effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work”).
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Sandoval v. New Line Cinema
Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)

18.

Showing plaintiff’s
lithographs of African
ceremonies in Made in
America film; when two
characters kiss, they
knock the lithographs
sideways

Jackson v. Warner Bros., Inc.,
993 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Mich.
1997)
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UNFAIR

UNFAIR

Service allowing
subscribers “to listen
over the telephone to
contemporaneous radio
broadcasts in remote
cities”

Staging nude photo of
pregnant Leslie Nielsen
in place of Demi
Moore, to advertise
Naked Gun, a film “due
this March”

Infinity Broad. Corp. v.
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir.
1998)

Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v.
Use of survey from
Lucent Techs., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d trademark infringement
238 (D. Del. 1998)
case by adverse party
Poster for Michael
Moore documentary
showing him smirking
in front of an oversized
microphone, mocking
famous Men in Black
poster

Duffy v. Penguin Books USA
Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D.N.Y.
1998)

Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Miramax Films Corp., 11 F.
Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. Cal. 1998)

Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.
1998)
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FAIR

FAIR

Similar holding
regarding The Official
Godzilla Compendium
Intermediate
photocopying of book
setting forth “style and
fashion for large sized
women”

Toho Co. v. William Morrow &
Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D.
Cal. 1998)

25.

FAIR

Publishing of fan book
called The Joy of Trek

1.
PRODUCTIVE

Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Carol Publ’g Group, 11 F. Supp.
2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
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Parody of Barney the
dinosaur assaulted by
The Famous Chicken at
sporting event
Pulsecom created
copies of software on its
cards by using RBOCs’
Litespan systems

Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc.,
142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998)

Richard Feiner & Co. v. H.R.I.
Indus., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1998)

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v.
Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166
F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)

Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 179
F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999)

DSC Communs. v. Pulse
Communs., Inc., 170 F.3d 1354
(Fed. Cir. 1999)

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

Selling abstracts of
news articles

Unauthorized use of
colorized photo of
Laurel & Hardy
perched at the edge of a
tall building to
introduce Hollywood
Reporter’s “Special
Effects & Stunts”
section

Reproducing
unpublished story by
author of The Yearling
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UNFAIR

UNFAIR

Michaels v. Internet Entm’t
Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823
(C.D. Cal. 1998)

32.

Unauthorized posting
to Internet of a film
depicting celebrities
having sex

UNFAIR

1.
PRODUCTIVE

Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of Distribution of free
the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d
shareware outside
782 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
licensed terms
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FAIR

FAIR

Newspaper stirs public
debate about the
educational value of
standardized test by
publishing substantial
portions of it
Reproduction of
“screen shot” from
Sony’s copyrighted
game to show superior
resolution of
defendant’s hardware

Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs.
v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d
919 (N.D. Ill. 2000)

Sony Computer Entm’t Am.,
Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d
1022 (9th Cir. 2000)

Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v.
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596
(9th Cir. 2000)
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Reverse engineering of
entire Sony PlayStation
BIOS to achieve
interoperability

FAIR

Educational Testing Serv. v.
Copying questions from
Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. standardized test for
“Hot Questions”
Cal. 1999)
portion of test
preparation course

40.
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FAIR
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FACTUAL

FACTORS
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FAIR

Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l,
Book about Beanie
Ltd., 81 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. Babies, replete with
historical essay, doll-by2000)
doll data, evaluation as
to price, and
recommendation as to
purchase

FAIR

39.

Use of plaintiff’s photo
as starting point to
produce digitally
altered scene of Las
Vegas strip

1.
PRODUCTIVE

Tiffany Design, Inc. v. RenoTahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F.
Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Nev. 1999)
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Party to construction
arbitration introduced
into evidence
photographs that it
commissioned but
declined to pay for

Newspaper published
old fashion photograph
depicting nude Joyce
Giraud, after she was
named “Miss Universe
Puerto Rico”
Boston Globe used
excerpts of videotape to
bolster its reportage
that talk show host
made veiled antiSemitic comments

Images Audio Visual Prods., Inc.
v. Perini Bldg. Co., 91 F. Supp.
2d 1075 (E.D. Mich. 2000)

Worldwide Church of God v.
Philadelphia Church of God,
Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.
2000)

Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News
Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000)

National Ass’n of Gov’t
Employees/Int’l Bhd. of Police
Officers v. BUCI Telev., Inc.,
118 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Mass.
2000)
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After reformed church
withdrew Mystery of the
Ages for theological
error, breakaway
church distributed it to
traditional adherents

Army cadets
appropriated “Mr. Bill”
to generate “spirit
message” broadcast
during Army/Navy
game

Williams v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 961
(C.D. Cal. 1999)
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Company offered
service “advertised as
permitting subscribers
to store, customize, and
listen to the recordings
contained on their CDs
from any place where
they have an internet
connection.”
Clips from B movies
used to create
documentary about the
impact the genre
exerted on the public
Brief snippets used of a
famous actor’s early
film appearances in the
context of a biography
about his career
Usage of music as
background to BBC
story about Irish
terrorists

UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d
349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc.,
147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y.
2001)

Hofheinz v. A&E Television
Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)

Byrne v. British Broad. Corp.,
132 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)

50.

51.

52.

53.

Advertisement for
clothing store featuring
model sporting
plaintiff’s eyeglass
jewelry

Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d
152 (2d Cir. 2001)
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Alice Randall’s The
Wind Done Gone
rectifies racist
underpinnings of the
largest seller of all time
(except The Bible)
Morphing image in
sequence highlighting a
century of photographs
contributed to famous
magazine

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001)

SunTrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th
Cir. 2001)

Greenberg v. National Geo.
Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir.
2001)

Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt.
Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897
(N.D. Cal. 2002)

Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280
F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002)

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

Internet search engine
reproduced
photographs in
thumbnail form

Pornographic animated
version of Star Wars
entitled Starballz

Internet search engine
provided peer-to-peer
access to MP3 files
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Use of image from
artist’s portfolio

Fleming v. Miles, 181 F. Supp. 2d
1143 (D. Or. 2001)

55.

After 14 year-old boy
killed 6 year-old girl
and jury rejected his
“wrestling defense,”
media watchdog
engaged in fundraising
efforts by copying
portions of
SMACKDOWN!

World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t,
Inc. v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d
514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
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First, the obligatory disclaimers. Every column in the chart is controversial,40 even the first one setting forth the case citation, as some cases were otherwise disposed of on appeal41 (and even the number to the left [1, 2, 3. . .], given
that not every reported case is rigorously included in the chart). The last column is especially controversial, because some district court cases merely denied
summary judgment rather than reaching a final conclusion on fair use,42 and
some appellate courts remanded for further factfinding rather than make a final
pronouncement of fair or unfair.43 Despite these difficulties, every cell in the
grid is assigned an entry of Fair or Unfair, as objectively as I could determine.44
To illustrate the chart’s composition, let us begin with Case One. In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,45 a scientist named Dr. Chickering made
photocopies from the Journal of Catalysis to support experiments he performed
in his Texaco lab.46 Because he did not write a new article based on submissions
to the Journal, but simply made wholesale copies, his exploitation was not productive. Factor One, therefore, receives an Unfair (by itself, inclining against
fair use).47 The subject articles that Dr. Chickering copied were both published
in the Journal of Catalysis and of a factual rather than creative nature. Factor
Two receives a Fair (by itself, inclining toward fair use). The subject photo-

40. As an example of the difficulty, consider Cases Six to Eight concerning the writings of L. Ron
Hubbard. Is the copyrighted work at issue factual? If so, the answer to Factor Two will be Fair; if not,
Unfair. To a Scientologist, the answer is yes, thus indicating Fair. One could take the prophet “at [his]
word and assume that [his narrative] is an unalterable fact, the product of discovery and not creativity.”
Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1076 (2d Cir. 1992) (addressing Oscar Ichazo’s “enneagram”).
Or one could adopt the stance of another court confronting copyright claims over religious writings: “If
I were to declare The Urantia Book to be a divine revelation dictated by divine beings, I would be
trampling upon someone’s religious faith. If I declared the opposite, I would be trampling upon
someone else’s religious faith. I shall do neither.” Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 895 F. Supp. 1337, 1338
(D. Ariz. 1995). Neither of those dodges strikes me as tenable for current purposes. I have therefore
called Hubbard’s writings “creative.” Although that label might offend devotees, it actually supports
the Church of Scientology, as it helps to weigh the second factor against fair use.
41. E.g., Richard Feiner & Co. v. H.R.I. Indus., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated
without opinion by 182 F.3d 901 (2d Cir. 1999); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d on other grounds 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998).
42. Even more equivocal is denying a preliminary injunction based on a failure to prove a
likelihood of success at an initial stage of the proceedings, as occurred in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media
Market Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
43. The Supreme Court did just that in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594
(1994).
44. Particularly vexing are cases that contain two separate fair use analyses, reaching a different
alignment of factors and even a different bottom line. See infra note 75.
45. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
46. Id. at 915-16.
47. One constant lesson to be borne in mind is that every formulation in the fair use realm is
capable of its own exegesis. Thus, one could define “productive” to mean “in service of a socially
laudable function,” in which case a Fair would go into the Factor One box. As indicated above,
“productive” for current purposes means that the defendant reworked the plaintiff’s expression to
create a new work of authorship, itself capable of copyright protection. By that formulation, Dr.
Chickering’s usage fails. However, one could legitimately define the term otherwise, such that
laboratory research potentially leading to a future publication, or creation of a plastic copy in case of
chemical spills, deserves the label “productive.”
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copies were of whole articles, thereby earning an Unfair for Factor Three.48
Finally, absent Dr. Chickering’s copying activities, Texaco would have needed
to enter more subscriptions to the Journal of Catalysis to have the desired articles in his laboratory, meaning there was actual damage to an established
market.49 Factor Four, therefore, also receives an Unfair. The court denied the
fair use defense, so the final column is filled in with Unfair. In this case, three
factors support the court’s conclusion.
Case Two differs from Case One with respect to the entries for Factors One
and Four. In Marshall & Swift v. BS&A Software,50 defendant did not simply
photocopy plaintiff’s works; it took tables from the Michigan Assessor’s Manual
and produced its own computer Equalization Appraisal Program to automate
the real estate assessment process.51 Accordingly, the use was productive, and
Factor One gets a Fair. In addition, although plaintiff claimed that it would
have charged defendant $95,000 as a licensing fee to reproduce the copied
materials, there is no indication from the case that an established market
existed for those materials, or that plaintiff suffered actual damage in the process (that is, that defendant would have paid the fee absent the infringement, the
way that Texaco presumably would have entered more subscriptions for the
Journal of Catalysis absent photocopying in Case One). In light of the circumstances, I entered a Fair for Case Two as to Factor Four, cognizant that the
situation is not altogether different from Case One, which attracted the opposite entry for this factor.52 In this case, only one factor supports the court’s conclusion.53
In nonscientific form,54 this top-sixty chart attempts to determine if a mechanistic view of the four factors reveals the secret of how fair use cases get
resolved. What does it reveal? I am not very adept at statistics, but I studied
48. Nonetheless, one could look at this issue differently, given that the subject photocopies did
not reproduce whole issues of the Journal of Catalysis.
49. It has already been remarked that the columns in the chart are more limited than the actual fair
use factors. In particular, Factor Four as defined in the statute is not limited to loss of revenue (the
simplified form in the chart). Instead, it looks to the entire potential market for the copyrighted work.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
50. 871 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
51. Id. at 954-55.
52. Among many tough choices, Factor Four presented a disproportionate share. Consider Case
Five. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal.
1995), the owner of film rights to James Bond filed suit over a humorous commercial involving a suave
spy, in the company of a beautiful woman, making his getaway from grotesque villains in a Honda.
There is an established market for 007 movies, but it is difficult to imagine actual damage to it from a
car commercial. In reality, plaintiff was apparently aggrieved because it had a product placement
agreement with BMW, and the Honda commercial perhaps threatened actual damage to that
relationship. Id. at 1301. But there was no indication that loss of revenue would result.
53. Based on a universe of only these two cases, one would conclude that the factors only have
50% reliability in predicting the ultimate resolution of the cases in which they arise. As will be seen,
the aggregate tally is basically in accord with that initial estimate.
54. Not only does the chart as a whole fail to cover every reported decision since 1994, but of the
cases selected, one could dispute just about every entry. Indeed, it would take little to convince me to
substitute Fair for Unfair (or vice versa) in many instances. Whether my detractors will wish to
champion the Mirror Chart (in which the polarity of each entry is reversed) remains to be seen.
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the chart to discern correlations. Of the twenty-four cases upholding fair use,
and the thirty-six cases denying its existence, the findings are as follows:
(1) The first factor corresponds to the conclusion of fair use fifty-five percent of the time;55
(2) The second factor corresponds to the conclusion of fair use forty-two
percent of the time;
(3) The third factor corresponds to the conclusion of fair use fifty-seven
percent of the time;56
(4) The fourth factor corresponds to the conclusion of fair use fifty percent
of the time;57
(5) The cumulative correspondence for all four factors is slightly under fiftyone percent.58
Beyond elevating the first and third factors slightly, while denigrating the
second, the numbers hardly tell a compelling story. The last figure is the most
revealing. Basically, had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the
upshot would be the same.
This conclusion is not to say that judges enter findings as to the four factors
in support of their ultimate fair use determination only half the time. Perusal of
fair use cases would reveal that the figure actually approaches ninety percent.
In other words, judges who uphold fair use almost always find that three, if not
four, of the factors incline in its favor; judges who deny the fair use defense
almost always find that three, if not four, of the factors incline against it.59 The
difference between the chart’s figure, showing virtually a dead heat, and the
actual figure pushing ninety percent, stems from the malleability of the fair use
factors.

55. Every time the final column indicates “Fair,” there is a correspondence in the first column
when it indicates “Fair.” Every time the final column indicates “Unfair,” there is a correspondence in
the first column when it indicates “Unfair.” Obviously, the test employed for the remaining factors is
the same.
56. It is a chestnut that “generally, it may not constitute a fair use if the entire work is reproduced.”
Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir 1998), quoting 4 NIMMER, supra note 1, §
13.05[A][3]. Yet the chart reveals that among the cases in which wholesale reproduction of the
copyrighted work took place, thirty-six percent upheld the usage as fair. (In other words, even when
the entry for Factor Three is Unfair, the case ultimately rules the utilization Fair in the chart’s final
entry thirty-six percent of the time.).
57. To test my own pet theory, I redid the chart pursuant to the functional test, by asking whether
the defendant used the work for a different function not within the purview of the plaintiff’s normal
exploitation of the work. The result (again, as agonizing and subject to disagreement as every other
attempt to fill in the chart) was to answer Fair for Cases 1, 5-10, 12, 15-18, 20, 22-27, 30, 33, 34, 36, 3943, 47-49, 51, 52, 54, 55, and 59, and Unfair for all others. To my chagrin, that change resulted in a fiftynine percent correspondence rate—an improvement, but hardly the silver bullet that I desired. But, as
previously noted, even with the functional test, one must still analyze each of the four factors. See supra
note 25.
58. In other words, of the 240 entries in the chart for Fair or Unfair under factors one through four,
the match with the ultimate conclusion of Fair or Unfair worked out only 50.8 % of the time.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65.
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First, each column heading in the chart represents far less than the totality
of the Copyright Act factor at issue. 60 It has already been noted that the first
factor, for example, contains categories in addition to productive usage.61 The
third factor, to offer another example, investigates the “amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” as
compared to the chart’s sole inquiry whether the usage is one hundred percent.
A given utilization could be less than one hundred percent (meaning it would
be listed as Fair in the chart) but still constitute substantially all of the copyrighted work quantitatively (inclining against fair use) or qualitatively (again
inclining against fair use). Plenty of room exists, therefore, for courts to reach
results not reflective of the reductionist approach of the chart.
Second, each factor contains wide room for subjective evaluation to come
into play. In the third factor just encountered, for example, what is qualitatively
substantial? In the first factor, what is a fair purpose? One could multiply the
questions endlessly, without finding ready answers.
Third, even after each factor is tallied, Congress included no mechanism for
weighing divergent results against each other and ultimately resolving whether
any given usage is fair. What is to be done when two factors are pro and two
con? When can one factor outweigh three? On those matters, the statute is
mute. Courts must therefore proceed by the seat of their pants.
In the ultimate analysis, my review of the cases convinces me that the high
correspondence in judicial opinions between the individual fair use factors and
courts’ ultimate disposition, as opposed to the absence of any meaningful correspondence in the chart, reflects an important insight into how judges actually
resolve fair use cases: Courts tend first to make a judgment that the ultimate
disposition is fair use or unfair use, and then align the four factors to fit that
result as best they can.62 At base, therefore, the four factors fail to drive the
analysis, but rather serve as convenient pegs on which to hang antecedent conclusions.
The courts are not to blame for that state of affairs. Rather, by injecting
such a high degree of subjectivity and imprecision into each factor and into their
cumulative application, as canvassed above, Congress essentially foreordained
that result in the 1976 Act. Thus, it is not surprising to discover, in a given case,
that the district judge found each of the four factors favoring fair use, whereas
the Court of Appeals, in reversing, concluded the very opposite as to each
factor.63 To quash the facile explanation that the district judge in such a case

60. The exception is Factor Two. Given that the chart combines both “published” and “factual,”
Factor Two actually represents a composite capturing most of the complexity of this prong of the
analysis—it reflects a Fair entry only when both those subfactors favor fair use.
61. See supra note 29.
62. Alternatively, as courts work their way through the four factors, at some point they decide
what the ultimate conclusion should be—which, in turn, molds the way that they reach resolution as to
which direction each factor points.
63. E.g., Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984). That decision
could be explained as straddling the Supreme Court’s clarification in Sony. But such an excuse fails to
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simply failed to understand copyright law as well as did the appellate panel of
three, it suffices to note that the same phenomenon has unfolded at the
Supreme Court level. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,64
six justices analyzed each of the four factors as disfavoring fair use; three justices, in dissent, reached the opposite conclusion as to each factor.65
By now, we have come far enough to realize that, pious words notwithstanding, it is largely a fairy tale to conclude that the four factors determine
resolution of concrete fair use cases.66 What of the conclusion that “a party
need not ‘shut-out’ her opponent on the four factor tally to prevail”? 67 It turns
out to be a fairy tale, too. The clash of the nine justices themselves in Harper &
Row demonstrates that jurists up to the Supreme Court level feel the need to
align the factors unanimously in favor of the desired result, perceiving that any
deviation could be a fatal chink in the armor.
But if there is a “shut-out,” the common wisdom goes, “victory on the fair
use playing field is assured.” 68 Is at least that much true? The chart again belies
it. One need proceed no further than Case Four before encountering unanimous Fair entries for the four factorsʊmeaning that this case must be the “fairest of them all,” yet the ultimate conclusion rejects fair use! Specifically, in
Robinson v. Random House, Inc.,69 the author of American Saga: Juan Trippe
and His Pan Am Empire alleged copyright infringement via publication of
American Icarus: The Majestic Rise and Tragic Fall of Pan Am. The latter book
was a new work of authorship, and therefore productive (Factor One inclining
toward fair use); the former book was both published and factual in nature
(Factor Two inclining toward fair use); the latter book copied far less than the
totality of the former (Factor Three inclining toward fair use); and the posture
more closely matches Case Two (loss of imputed license fee that copyright
owner claimed adverse party should have paid) than Case One (ready market in
subscription already existed, which would have resulted in revenue had the
infringing conduct not occurred). Therefore, I conclude that the former book
did not cause a loss in revenue (Factor Four inclining toward fair use). In sum,
all four factors of the chart show Fair, yet the court70 determined Unfair. The
situation is not an anomaly; Cases Thirty-Four and Thirty-Seven show the same

apply to the district court’s finding three factors against fair use and one neutral in New Era
Publications International, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group, 729 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), followed
by a reversal in which the Second Circuit concluded that each of the four factors inclined in favor of fair
use. 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990).
64. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
65. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05[A][5].
66. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
67. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 740 (2d Cir. 1991).
68. Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1079 (2d Cir. 1992).
69. 877 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
70. Of course, the court bolstered its finding by aligning Factors One, Two, and Four against fair
use. As previously noted, the chart does not track the analysis actually employed in fair use cases, as
that exercise would show a 90% correspondence.

NIMMER_FMT(3).DOC

Winter/Spring 2003]

03/20/03 3:43 PM

“FAIREST OF THEM ALL”

283

pattern.71 This recurring equation of Fair x 4 = Unfair is a frightening confirmation of how deeply rooted the fairy tales have become.
What about the converse phenomenon? Case Sixty presents an exemplar.
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,72 plaintiff Kelly complained that photographs on
his web site had been made subject of thumbnail sketches on defendant’s search
engine. The engine simply presented the images as is, rather than molding them
into new works of authorship, so no productive use was present (Factor One
inclining against fair use); the photographs in question evinced creativity, unlike
articles about catalysis or tables of Michigan property values (Factor Two
inclining against fair use); the subject thumbnails reproduced the whole images
(Factor Three inclining against fair use);73 and plaintiff was at least able to present an argument that he had suffered damage to an established market (Factor
Four inclining against fair use).74 In this instance, all four entries in the chart
show Unfair, yet both district court and Ninth Circuit determined Fair on fair
use.75 Again, the situation is not wholly anomalous, as Case Forty-Seven demonstrates.76
71. Another instance almost matching the same scenario is Case 53. In Byrne v. British
Broadcasting Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the BBC used background music in a
television segment on an FBI investigation of gun smuggling from Florida to Ireland. Its segment was a
new work of authorship, and therefore productive; the plaintiff’s song in issue was published, but not
factual (therefore making Factor Two equivocal); the BBC’s copying related only to a small segment,
far less than the whole; and there would have been no payment for the song absent the BBC’s
infringing conduct. In sum, three and a half factors favored fair use, but the court denied it.
72. 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
73. The salient fact about thumbnail reproductions is that they lose most digital information from
the original. Therefore, from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective, much less than the whole
is reproduced. Nonetheless, in filling out the chart, I put Unfair for Factor Three, inasmuch as the
thumbnail sketch nominally reproduces the plaintiff’s image wholesale.
74. The opinion below ventilates this aspect:
Plaintiff argues the market for his various products has been harmed. Defendant’s conduct
created a possibility that some users might improperly copy and use Plaintiff’s images from
Defendant’s site. Defendant’s search engine also enabled users to “deep link” directly to the
pages containing retrieved images, and thereby bypass the “front page” of the originating
Web site. As a result, these users would be less likely to view all of the advertisements on the
Web sites or view the Web site’s entire promotional message.
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120-21 (C.D. Cal. 1999). One must lean very far in
plaintiff’s direction to accept his self-serving characterizations.
75. Actually, there were two fair use decisions in the case. The one I highlight in the chart
concerns thumbnail images, which drew a long analysis from the Ninth Circuit. See Kelly, 280 F.3d at
940-44. Personally, I agree with that determination in favor of fair use. See 4 NIMMER 2003, supra note
12, §13.05[G]. But a separate part of the opinion treats, in more abbreviated form, defendant’s claim of
fair use for inline linking to full-size images. See Kelly, 280 F.3d at 947-48. As to that issue, the court
rejected fair use, a conclusion in which I part company with the Ninth Circuit. See 3 NIMMER 2003,
supra note 12, § 12B.01[A][2]. Instead of including two separate references in the chart for the same
case, I encapsulated it into its primary ruling. (As of this writing, the Ninth Circuit has decided to
entertain rehearing on the latter issue in Kelly, meaning that it still remains possible for the case’s two
fair use holdings to converge.)
76. In Núñez v. Caribbean International News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000), the reproduction
of a nude photograph of “Miss Universe Puerto Rico” was not productive, even though it appeared in
the larger context of a newspaper, for the reason set forth in supra note 33. Although a photograph of
the Las Vegas strip may be so pedestrian as to be essentially factual rather than imaginative (see Factor
Two for Case Thirty-Eight, Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D.
Nev. 1999)), I am presuming that the artistic decisions involved in posing Ms. Giraud nude made that
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The “assured” victory when all factors incline a certain way turns out to be
just another fairy tale.77 Instead, fair use runs deeper than any mechanistic
exercise can capture.78 For that reason, it seems unlikely that anyone will
develop a heuristic device for computer programs to calculate when fair use
should apply—at least, at any time before machines become human.79
IV
THE POESIE ALBUM
It is time now to leave the cornucopia of cases in the chart, which collectively defy convenient categorization, and to focus on a single case, that might
itself confound. Consider the image that a client recently brought to me, set
forth on the facing page, which has never before been published.
On March 4, 1940, Nazi troops had already taken over Czechoslovakia and
Poland. In Western Europe, relative calm still prevailed, albeit punctuated by
infinite worry. A Jewish girl named Henny Scheerder hosted a birthday party
in Amsterdam, to which she invited her friends. One was a young lady named
Anne Frank. In her keepsake book (poesie album), Henny asked the assembled friends to each sign a page with personal memories. Young Anne affixed
some stickers (presumably copyrighted by someone else, although that is not
the focus here) to Henny’s album, then she wrote Beate Henny (“Dear Henny”)
followed by (translating loosely from the Dutch): “It’s of little worth what I can
offer you—pluck roses on earth, and forget me not.”
In her paper for this conference, Pamela Samuelson contrasts a grocery list,
that she calls “detritus,” against a “gem” like a Mozart symphony.80 I submit
photograph closer to the creative side of the spectrum. In terms of loss of revenue (Factor Four), the
standard used in the chart is whether defendant’s usage deprived the plaintiff of revenue that likely
would have accrued absent the allegedly infringing conduct. When the only allegation is that
defendant’s own utilization should have occasioned a royalty payment, there is no such damage (which
is why Factor Four inclines toward Fair in such instances as Case Fifteen, Lamb v. Starks, 949 F. Supp.
753 (N.D. Cal. 1996); absent defendant’s usage of the subject movie trailer to demonstrate its 3-D
technology, no market for that usage would have likely arisen). In this case, by contrast, after Ms.
Giraud was named “Miss Universe Puerto Rico,” there could have been a market for old photographs
of her, independent of defendant’s exploitation, which could have been harmed by that exploitation.
For that reason, Factor Four indicates Unfair.
77. One could also posit other explanations for the cases in the chart, such as: Usage in Litigation
Is Always Fair (see Cases 22 and 28). But it is not always so (see Case 45). Another candidate might
be: Usage for News Is Always Fair (see Cases 9, 22, 47, 48). Again, not always (see Cases 20, 35, 41,
53). What about: Capitalizing on Sex Is Always Unfair (see Case 32). Nope (see Cases 30, 47, 59). At
the moment, Combating Prejudice in Plaintiff’s Work Is Always Fair (see Cases 9, 48, 57) holds sway,
with no contrary case. But one would have to be foolhardy in the extreme to guarantee victory on the
fair use defense to a defendant in the next case in which it is combating prejudice in plaintiff’s work.
78. Indeed, if one takes seriously the notion that the four factors are nonexclusive, meaning that
non-enumerated factors may also be taken into account, then it must be so. See New Era Publ’ns Int’l,
ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., 873 F.2d 576, 588 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (“I emphasize
non-exclusive. . .”).
79. See David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1 (1996).
80. Paula Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 151 (Winter/Spring 2003). See also David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea
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that Anne Frank’s words penned on March 4, 1940, challenge that dichotomy.
Having left her parents that day amidst news from the east of the Nazi juggernaut (may their names be blotted out), Anne offered “nothing” but the advice
to “pluck roses on earth, and forget me not.” In my estimation, her short reflection offers much more than its “nothing” self-characterization—indeed, it is a
little gem.
Henny survives to this day, thank G-d. Her poesie album, meanwhile, has
come into the possession of The Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, California, which came to me for pro bono copyright advice.81 (The Center is getting
full value for what it paid!) Although the Wiesenthal Center has no objection to
my setting forth the image, it does not pretend to be the copyright owner. The
claimant to that status is The Anne Frank Foundation in Basel, Switzerland,
purportedly recipient of a grant from Anne Frank’s sole survivor, her father.82
The Foundation has not consented to the use of the work in any form.
What is the status of the exploitation planned by the Wiesenthal Center of
selling postcards and posters of this image at its onsite gift shop? From the
standpoint of the four fair use factors, one could posit at first blush that such a
use poses an easy copyright case requiring denial of the defense. Running
quickly through the four factors: the purpose of the use is fundraising and hence
commercial; the nature of Anne’s work is creative and unpublished; the amount
to be copied is one hundred percent; and the potential market for the Swiss
foundation to sell its own postcards and posters will be clobbered. Accordingly,
all four factors disfavor the fair use defense.
One delightful aspect of David Lange’s foundation paper83 is its utter lack of
concern for any precedent or decided case. Explicitly employing that methodology, let us run backwards through the four factors as they affect the subject
page from the poesie album.
The fourth factor looks to the effect on the potential market. Justin
Hughes, a colleague at UCLA, has developed an intriguing way of looking at
the fair-use doctrine without giving undue deference to copyright owners whose
terms Congress may repeatedly extend. He posits that courts should examine
the effect on the market over time.84 So, if The Jazz Singer from 1928 is at issue,
any usage made in 2002 will leave the work unaffected from 1928-2001, and
therefore can exert only a relatively limited effect on the copyright considered
over its life as a whole. How does that logic apply here? Anne Frank’s murder

Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 41 n.155, 177 (2001) (considering copyright in
laundry lists) [hereinafter Nimmer, Dead Sea Scrolls].
81. Since receiving the donation of the poesie album, the Wiesenthal Center has placed it on
display at its Museum of Tolerance, located a few blocks from my home. A public display does not
constitute publication. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 4.09.
82. Another potential claimant could be the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation,
recipient of all Anne Frank’s papers. For simplicity, current analysis will focus on the Swiss foundation.
83. See Lange & Anderson, supra note 6.
84. Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 43 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). I thank Justin for
his many helpful suggestions incorporated herein.
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in 194585 means that her work would have expired in 1995,86 except its unpublished status gave it protection through at least December 31, 2002.87 Congress’
later extension of all terms, via the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act,88 now protects this work through 2015.89 No matter what my client does
today, there will be no effect on the market for Anne Frank’s page during at
least the period from its inception in 1940 through 2003. Accordingly, the
potential effect on the market (solely during its last twelve years of subsistence)
is highly circumscribed, inclining Factor Four in favor of fair use.
Looked at from another perspective, The Anne Frank Foundation in Basel
not only has never exploited this work, but does not even possess a single copy
of it that it could exploit; the sole original is at the Wiesenthal Center. The
Foundation thus has no potential market for the work which could be adversely
affected. Again, Factor Four would favor fair use.90
Winding back to the third factor, what is the “amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole?”91 I previously
mentioned that the copying was one hundred percent (corresponding to the
term “wholesale” in the chart above). But the statute does not refer to percentages; it refers to “amount.” The amount of the copying in this case is precisely
eighteen words (or sixteen, excluding the salutation, Beate Henny). That
amount is minuscule. In the nonprecedential way that I am currently proceeding, this factor therefore inclines sharply in favor of fair use.
What about the second factor, looking to the nature of the work? Anne’s
few words were no more destined for publication than a grocery list.92 They are,
in that sense, no more dear to the copyright core than is a ransom note—
something that is technically subject to copyright protection, but which was not
written because of the incentive to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts.93 This factor could favor fair use as well.
85. Historians believe that Anne perished in the typhus epidemic at the Bergen-Belsen
Concentration Camp in March 1945.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976) (amended 1978).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1976) (amended 1978). Failure to publish the work by that date forfeited
the option of extending its term until December 31, 2047. Id.
88. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 11 Stat. 2827 (1998).
89. See Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (Winter/Spring 2003); Charlotte Hess & Elinor
Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 111 (Winter/Spring 2003).
90. This conclusion is admittedly glib. After all, to the extent that the Center began selling
postcards and posters, the Swiss Foundation would have access to something that it itself could exploit.
Indeed, even if the Center only displayed the work, the Foundation could send someone to Los
Angeles to view it and subsequently sketch it from memory. See supra note 81.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
92. EDITOR’S NOTE: When this article was in proof prints, the Wiesenthal Center conveyed to
Professor Nimmer information it had just learned about the poesie album, indicating that the poem
might indeed have been intended for publication (and, what is more, was based on a poem authored by
another). For ruminations about this latest twist, see David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 482-83 (Winter/Spring 2003).
93. Leval, supra note 24, at 1108.
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Finally, we return to the first factor. Considering the nature of the work, I
cannot get past the fact that its author pleaded “forget me not.” That request
affects the purpose of the use, to which the first factor adverts. The Wiesenthal
Center’s exploitation is designed to preserve the memory of a most poignant
victim of the Holocaust. To use copyright law as an instrument to suppress dissemination of her words runs afoul of both the author’s purpose and the work’s
nature.94 From the nonprecedential method just elaborated, the four factors
unanimously favor a finding of fair use.
V
CONCLUSION
So which is it, fair use or unfair use? I firmly believe the Wiesenthal
Center’s potential exploitation of the poesie album to be fair. But the problem
with the four factors is they are malleable enough to be crafted to fit either
point of view.95 Where does that leave us? The Supreme Court puts it pithily:
Professor [Melville] Nimmer notes: Perhaps no more precise guide can be stated than
Joseph McDonald’s clever paraphrase of the Golden Rule: Take not from others to
such an extent and in such a manner that you would be resentful if they so took from
you. This equitable rule of reason permits courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
96
designed to foster.

Father knows best. Although that formulation scarcely resolves concrete cases,
it provides the beginning of wisdom97 by acknowledging that rigid application of
set formulae may itself prove inexact. In the end, reliance on the four statutory
factors to reach fair use decisions often seems naught but a fairy tale.

94. This case presents the inverse of the Dead Sea Scrolls case—there, the owner of the one
physical artifact containing the historic words tried to use copyright law to keep the world out by
avoiding publication; in the instant case, by contrast, the owner of that one artifact is trying to achieve
wide-scale dissemination and faces a potential copyright claim in return. See Nimmer, Dead Sea
Scrolls, supra note 80.
95. As to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
The malleability of fair use emerges starkly from the fact that all three cases were overturned
at each level of review, two of them by split opinions at the Supreme Court level.
4 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05 (footnote omitted).
96. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 n.3(citations and quotations omitted).
97. Cf. Proverbs 1:7; Psalms 111:10.

